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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FRANCES H. BOWEN, Administratrix of
the Estate of J. PARRY BOWEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
CULBERT L. OLSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

* * * * *

CULBERT L. OLSON,
Cross-Complainant and Respondent,
vs.
FRANCES H. BOWEN, Administratrix of
the Estate of J. PARRY BOWEN, et al.,
Cross-Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
8060

APPE~TS'BRIEF

PREFACE
In this appeal the question is not one of the facts

found by the Lower Court in his Memorandum Decision
(Rec. 63-86), but rather that the Lower Court erred in construing the law as applied to those facts in the following
particulars:
1. In interpreting the facts shown in his Memorandum
1
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Decision (Rec. 63-86) into his Findings of Fact (Rec.
97-102).
2. That the conclusions of law, and decree are clearly
against both the law, and the evidence as found in said
Memorandum Decision.
The facts are not disputed only in a few very minor
particulars as they are set forth in said Memorandum Decision and in such instances they are pointed out. Except as
hereinafter pointed out, the facts as set forth in saiq Memorandum Decision are referred to as controlling in this brief.
However, appellants do not accept any conclusions of law
that may be made by the lower court on the legal effect of
the failure to pay the 1947 and 1948 taxes before they became delinquent on November 30th of each respective year,
nor the legal conclusions that such failure terminated the
adverse possession of the plaintiffs.
FACTS
This action was commenced by the filing of a complaint (Rec. 1-6) on September 22, 1948. The complaint
was in the so-called "short form" and did not allege adverse
possession or the payment of taxes. A considerable amount
of land was involved other than the 80 acres of land involved in this action and appeal, and described as the North
half of the Southwest quarter of Section 34, in Township
1 South of Range 1 East of the Uintah Special Meridian.
The plaintiff, J. Parry Bowen also known as J. Perry Bowen,
has died since the commencement of the action, and Fran2
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ces H. Bowen, Administratrix of the Estate of J. Parry
Bowen, Deceased, has been substituted as a party plaintiff.
However, at the time of the commencement of this action,
J. Parry Bowen had no interest in the lands involved in
this appeal, he having conveyed all of his right, title and
interest in the lands to Keith J. Bowen on April 26th, 1947
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, page 55).
The defendant and respondent, Culbert L. Olson, filed
an "Answer" (Rec. 7-8) which is verified on October 21st,
1949 but bears no filing date. In this purported answer,

.

---

the defendant makes no claim whatsoever to any particular piece of the property involved in the action by definitely

-

describing the same. He makes no affirmative allegations
claiming ownership of the subject property.

---

On January 9th, 1950, defendant and appellant, Culbert
L. Olson, filed a "Cross-Complaint" (Rec. 17-20), which was
followed by his ''FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT''

·-·

·__..·

·._..

(Rec. 21-25), filed March 31st, 1950; his "SECOND AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT" (Rec. 26-30) filed April 27th,
1950; his "THIRD AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT" (Rec.
31-36), filed April 28th, 1950; and his "CROSS-COMPLAINT of Defendant CULBERT L. OLSON, Amending
and Replacing His Third Amended Cross-Complaint (Rec.
43-50).

11 ~~

WJ!e&

errY~

and Ft

Cross-Complainant Olson made his first claim of

ownership and possession of the subject land in his first
Cross-Complaint, and prayed for a judgment quieting his
title to that particular land for the first time. His succeeding cross-complaints likewise prayed that his title be quieted

3
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although they changed their substance.
On April 21st, 1950, defendant Olson filed his "AMENDED ANSWER OF CULBERT L. OLSON" (Rec. 12-14)
in which he made a counter-claim for the first time and in
which he alleged ownership and possession and the necessary requisites for a short form in an action to quiet title.
lie prayed that his title be quited to the subject lands.
On April 3rd, 1950, in their "ANSWER TO FIRST
AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT", the plaintiffs and
cross-defendants alleged the necessary requisites of adverse
possession and that they "have paid all taxes and assessments levied or assessed thereon during said period."
In all subsequent pleadings of the plaintiffs and cross-

defendants, namely: "ANSWER TO TIITRD AMENDED
CROSS COMPLAINT" (Rec. 40-42) filed May 2nd, 1950;
''ANSWER TO CROSS COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT
CULBERT L. OLSON AMENDING AND REPLACING
HIS THIRD AMENDED CROSS COMPLAINT" (Rec. 5155), filed May 27th, 1950; and "ANSWER TO CROSSCLAIM, IN AMENDED ANSWER" (Rec. 15-16), filed September 21st, 1950; the plaintiffs and cross defendants alleged the necessary facts constituting adverse possession for
seven years and the payment of all taxes levied or assessed
during said period, as well as limitations and laches.
The cause was tried before the court without a jury from
December 9th to December 12, 1952 (Rec. 97).
The trial court filed his Memorandum Decision (Rec.
4
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63-86) on January 27th, 1953, in which he reviewed the evidence, and which decision contained, among other things
the matters shown in the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J) as follows:

~~: ..

·-:--:

-

....

1. Defendant and cross-complainant, Culbert L. Olson,
obtained title to the subject lands by Sheriff's Deed dated
February 25th, 1916, recorded March 3rd, 1916, in Book
"20" of Deeds, pages 35-36 (pages 26-27.)
2. Defendant and cross-complainant, Culbert L. Olson,
failed to pay the taxes for the year 1933, and subsequent
taxes for the years 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937, and a tax
sale was made of the property dated December 21st, 1933,
as shown in Tax Sale Record for the year 1933, page 32,
line 9, Tax Sale No. 413 (page 32).
3. Auditor's Tax Deed was issued by the Auditor of
Uintah County, Utah, to Uintah County, covering the lands
in question, dated April 15th, 1938, recorded May; 9th, 1938,
in Book 31 of Deeds, pages 426-427 of the records of Uintah
County, Utah (page 33).
4. Uintah County sold the subject lands to Burns Hallet
on September 30th, 1940, as shown by commissioners minutes and an "Agreement for Salt of Real Property" shown
at pages 34-36.
5. Uintah County conveyed its interest in the property
to Burns Hallet on September 22nd, 1943, by Tax Deed recorded September 28th, 1943, in Book "34" of Deeds, page
54, of the records of Uintah County, Utah (page 37).

5
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6. Burns Hallet and wife conveyed this property to J.
Parry Bowen by Quit Claim Deed dated December 20th,
1945, recorded January 15th, 1946, in Book "35" of Deeds,
page 263 of the records of Uintah County, Utah (page 38).
7. J. Parry Bowen, also known as J. Perry Bowen, also
known as J. P. Bowen, and his wife, conveyed to J. A.
Cheney an undivided one half interest in and to all of the
oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be
produced from the lands involved in this action and other
lands, by Mineral Deed acknowledged August 19th, 1946,
recorded August 21, 1946, in Book "10" of Miscellaneous,
pages 332-333, of the records of Uintah County, Utah (pages
41-42).
8. J. A. Cheney and wife conveyed one-eighth interest
in and to all oil, gas and other minerals, in and under, and
that may be produced from the subject lands, to J. R. Robertson, by Mineral Deed dated June 14th, 1948, recorded
July 14th, 1948, in Book "13" of Miscellaneous, page 122 of
the records of Uintah County, Utah (page 43).
9. A Royalty Contract was made by J. A. Cheney and
Jennie L. Cheney, his wife to Guy T. Woodworth, conveying
an undivided one-fourth interest in and to all of the oil, gas
and other minerals in and under and that may be produced
from the subject lands, and dated July 26th, 1947, recorded
July 28th, 1947, in Book "12" of Miscellaneous, pages 210211 {pages 46-47).
10. A Quit Claim Deed was given by J. Parry Bowen
6
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and wife to Keith J. Bowen, dated April 26th, 1947, recorded May 15th, 1947, in Book "36" of Deeds, page 338, as
Entry No. 30095, covering the lands involved in this action
(page 55).
11. A WarrantyDeed was executed by Keith J. Bowen
and wife, to Morley Dean and Irene M. Dean as joint tenants
and not as tenants in common with full right of survivorship,
dated May 8th, 1947, recorded May 15th, 1947, in Book
"36" of Deeds, page 338, Entry No. 30096, in which the
grantor reserves all of the minerals, oils and gases upon, in
or under the said lands (page 56) .
12. Assessment and payment of taxes for the period
from 1940 to 1946 inclusive, and for the year 1949 are
shown at page 59.
13. A preliminary tax sale was made for taxes delinquent for the year 1947, and subsequent delinquent taxes
for the year 1948, which is undated. There is no record of
the filing of this tax sale record in the abstract (page 60).
14. Redemption Certificate dated December 30th, 1949,
showing redemption of the tax sale shown at item 13 (page
61,) by "J. Perry Bowen by Morley Dean."
15. Oil and Gas Lease from Keith J. Bowen and Norma
H. Bowen, his wife, to Phillips Petroleum Company, dated
December 8th, 1945, recorded May 13th, 1946, in Book "9"
of Miscellaneous, pages 573-78, Entry No. 26474 (pages
39-40).

7
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16. Oil and Gas Lease from J. Parry Bowen, et al., to
Phillips Petroleum Company, dated November 20th, 1946,
recorded December 9th, 1946, in Book "11" of Miscellaneous
pages 495-9, Entry No. 28639 (pages 53-54).
There are other conveyances in the abstract which
occurred subsequent to the filing of the action which do not
affect this proceeding.
In his Memorandum Decision, the trial judge gives his
opinion and decision as to the facts of adverse possession
and the payment of taxes (Rec. 63-86). The facts on adverse possession and the payment of taxes are accepted by
the plaintiffs and cross-defendants except in minor details,
but object to the legal effect of such facts.
At page 76 of the record, said Memorandum Decision
reads:
"It is therefore held that the possession of Hallet,
Bowen and Dean, in succession for the full seven
years was open and notorious within the requirements of the law. Thus, unless the plaintiffs have
failed to pay all taxes levied and assessed during
the adverse period, and unless such failure if any,
results in an interruption of the adverse possession, the Court will have to hold plaintiffs' possession adequate to entitle plaintiffs to judgment."
(Emphasis appellants)
"The latter question with respect to plaintiffs'
payment of the taxes assessed against the subject
land for the full required seven years of adversity,
is raised by the defendant and reserved in the
Pre-Trial Order."

*****
8
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"The record shows that no taxes were assessed
against the subject lands in 1940 or 1941. It shows
that each year thereafter to and including the
year 1946, all taxes were promptly paid. In 1947,
however, assessment was properly made in the
name of J. Parry Bowen, as owner, the apparent
title following the Burns Hallet purchase being in
him. Those taxes were not paid in 1947 and the
property was sold to Uintah County. The 1948
taxes assessed against the property were not paid
at due date and the amount of the taxes, interest,
penalties and costs were added to the 1947 certification. On December 30, 1949, all delinquent
taxes, interest, penalties and costs were paid by
'J. Parry Bowen by Morley Dean,' (the latter having succeeded to the County's rights on May 8,
1947,) and a Redemption Certificate was issued.
Payment of such taxes is mandatory if an adverse
claimant is to obtain title." (Emphasis ours.)

***

:)(<

*

"Thus it is clear that unless this Redemption is a
payment of 'taxes which have been levied and
assessed upon such land according to law,' the
adverse claimants, plaintiffs, have failed to establish their title by adverse possession." (Rec. 77)
Continuing on page 81 the Memorandum Decision
states:
"1947 and 1948 taxes were not paid. This action
began by the filing of the Complaint on September 22, 1948, and the redemption of the two delinquent years' taxes did not occur until December
30, 1949, a year, three months and eight days after
the action began. Thus, on the date the action
began the plaintiff's predecessor in interest had
paid taxes for only six, and not seven consecutive,
'continuous,' years as required by the statute."
9
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On page 84 of the record, in his Memorandum Decision,
the Lower Court after having discussed the status of the
defendant, Olson, as being barred by the provisions of Section 104-2-7, U. C. A. 1943 (now 78-12-7 U. C. A. 1953)
makes the following comment:
"But because he is the title holder, and because his
possession is presumed in the law, whenever the
adverser either fails to maintain his possession in
all of its elements, or whenever he fails to pay any
taxes lawfully levied and assessed against the
land, by such failure he changes his status from an
adverser to that of a mere trespasser, the constructive possession of the legal title holder attaches, and the adverser, if he is to acquire title, must
build from that point forward his seven years of
adversity and payment of taxes."
At pages 84 and 85 of the record, the Memorandum
Decision states:
"The situation of the facts and law of the instant
case might well induce the same expression as the
court uses on page 545 of the Utah Report (Keller
vs. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318) : 'There
are no equities on appellants' (defendant's) side of
this case. It tends to offend one's sense of justice.
x x we are x x forced to adhere to the cases so
far decided on the strict rule.' "
In concluding his Memorandum Decision, the Lower
Court states on page 85 of the record:
"It is thus ordered that judgment enter in favor
of the defendant Culbert L. Olson upon plaintiffs'
Complaint, No Cause of Action, and that the defendant Culbert L. Olson have judgment in his

10
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favor and against the plaintiffs and each and all
thereof upon his counterclaim and cross complaint."
After the filing of the Memorandum Decision above
quoted, the plaintiffs made their "Motion to Reopen" found
on pages 91 to 94 of the record. This motion was based
upon Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It went to the
effect that there was no evidence before the court and no
presumption could be raised that the taxes for the year
1947 were assessed upon said land according to law as required by Section 104-2-12 U. C. A. 1943 (now 78-12-12 U.
C. A. 1953) to support the finding of the Lower Court that
the plaintiff failed to pay all of the taxes which had been
legally assessed upon the said land described in the plaintiffs'
Complaint on file in the action. The affidavit suporting said
motion was made for the purpose of showing "That the
taxes for the year 1947, in Uintah County, State of Utah,
were not assessed according to law." (Rec. 91-94.)
The motion was denied (Rec. 95-96) as follows:
"The Court thus holds plaintiff to be in error in
his contention that the title holder has the burden
of proving that any tax assessed but unpaid during
the adverse period was assessed 'according to law,'
but to the contrary, holds that the adverser has
the burden of proving that he paid all seven years
taxes, or that there were no taxes assessed in any
year in which he failed to pay taxes, or that any
years taxes assessed which he did not pay were
not 'lawfully assessed.' " (Emphasis ours.)
It is to be noted here that the Lower Court had already

11
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found in his Memorandum Decision at page 15 (Rec. 77)
that the plaintiffs had paid the taxes.
The Lower Court wrote and filed his own findings,
conclusions and decree (Rec. 97-107).
No. 4 (Rec. 103) reads:

Conclusion of Law

"That defendant Culbert L. Olson is entitled to
have the decree of this Court made and entered
herein awarding him judgment against the plaintiffs' Complaint, and in his favor upon his Counterclaim, quieting title in him, in and to the real property described in paragraph 1 of the Findings of
Fact above." (Emphasis ours.)
Plaintiffs and cross-defendants then made a "MOTION
TO REOPEN" supported by affidavit (Rec. 108-112), and a
''MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL" supported by affidavit (Rec.
113-117) which were filed April lOth, 1953. The first motiion was based upon rule 60 (b) (1) and (7) that through
mistake, inadvertance, surprise and excusable neglect, the
plaintiffs should be allowed to present evidence on the assessment for 1947 which was not made according to law in
order that substantial justice might be done according to
the Lower Court's statement at the bottom of page 84 and
the top of page 85 of the record. The second motion was
based upon Rule 52 (b) and Rule 59 (a) (4), (6) and (7),
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for substantially the
same reasons.
The Lower Court entered his "ORDER OVERRULING
MOTIONS" on May 26th, 1953, as shown at page 120 of the
record.
12
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The following facts are stated for the purpose of showing the inception of adverse possession:
Burns Hallett bought the property from Uintah County
on September 30th, 1940 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 34-36).
He immediately went upon it and ascertained the boundaries
(Tr. 26). He made an arrangement with the Indian Department for exchange use of grazing on March 20th, 1941, or
thereabouts (Tr. 36, Tr. 188). Prior to that date, Hallett
had been using Indian lands and the Indians had been using
his lands (Tr. 37, Tr. 195). The arrangement for grazing
was made as the result of the respective use by the other
of the lands involved (Tr. 37, Tr. 197). John K. Arnold
knew of Burns Hallett's claim of ownership in 1940 (Tr.
124). William H. Arnold knew of his ownership in 1940
or 1941 (Tr. 161).
/

As to the facts barring defendant and cross-complainant by limitations and laches on the part of the said defendant, the following are stated:
Culbert L. Olson went to California in 1921 (Tr. 4). In
his testimony from pages 3 to 22 of the transcript, he is very
vague on his recollection of the events from the time he quit
paying taxes in 1933 up to the present time. In his letters
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits F, Hand I) he first says "I do not know
at this time what interest I have in the land in Uintah
County'' and then tries to show that he had leases on the
property under which the present adversers agreed to pay
the taxes and then didn't. He repudiates the facts stated
13
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in the letters in his testimony (Tr. 16 et. seq.). He did not,
during that time, personally supervise the property and left
it up entirely to Clarence I. Johnson (Tr. 11, 12) who was
supposedly his agent but whom he did not mention in his
said letters. His only knowledge of Ercel Johnson was told
to him by Clarence I. Johnson in 1946 (Tr. 12). He couldn't
find any files or records to ascertain what lands he owned
in Uintah County and any leases which he could have made
on them (Tr. 16, 17, 240). He had no record of any correspondence concerning this land (Tr. 12). His only contact
with this land between 1933 and March, 1950, was a conversation had with Clarence I. Johnson in Los Angeles in
1946 (Tr. 11-12, Tr. 241-242, Tr. 251). He testified "that
from 1934 on, * * * until 1943, and past, I was so occupied
in public life that these matters were neglected by me to
make injuiry into" (Tr. 10). The abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, page 39-40, 43-54) shows two oil and gas
leases were executed on this land in 1945 and 1946. This
abstract was forwarded to the defendant and received by
him on December 19th, 1949 (Tr. 241). He was told by
Mr. Stanley in a telephone conversation on December 7th,
1949, that there was an oil well drilling in the vicinity
"about nine miles away." (Tr. 260).
Boyd Winn, defendant's witness, never heard of Culbert
L. Olson until a few days before the first trial in 1950 (Tr.
207). He never heard of any claim of Culbert L. Olson
being the owner of said land (Tr. 211) although he had resided right next to it since 1943.
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POINTS

I.
APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT ADVERSE POSSESSION COMMENCED ON SEPTEMBER 30th, 1940, AND
WAS ESTABLISHED SEPTEMBER 30th, 1947.

II.
REDEMPTION OF THE 1947 AND 1948 TAXES ON
DECEMBER 30th, 1949 HAD THE SAME EFFECT AS
IF THE TAXES WERE PAID BEFORE DLINQUENCY.

III.
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED
THE MOTIONS TO REOPEN AND THE MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL.
IV.

APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED A
i·

:t

DECREE QUIETING THEIR TITLE AS CROSS-DEFENDANTS ON THEIR ANSWER TO THE CROSS-COMPLAINT
OF RESPONDENT, AND AS PLAINTIFFS ON THEIR
ANSWER TO THE COUNTER-CLAIM IN THE AMENDED ANSWER OF TTHE DEFENDANT.
A. APPELLANTS PAID ALL TAXES ASSESSED
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CROSS-COMPLAINT
AND PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COUNTER-CLAIM
IN THE AMENDED ANSWER.
B.

THE REDEMPTION OF THE 1947 AND 1948
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TAXES ON DECEMBER 30, 1949, WAS THE PAYMENT
OF TTAXES UNDER SECTION 78-12-12 U.C.A. 1953.
C. AGAINST THE COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSSCOMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT, PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS CAN
RELY UPON THE REDEMPTION AND PAYMENT OF
TAXES ON DECEMBER 30th, 1949.

v.
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT OLSON
IS BARRED BY LACHES FROM ASSERTING HIS ANSWER, CROSS-COMPLAINTS AND COUNTER-CLAIM.
VI.

THE LOWER COURT MADE SOME MINOR ERRORS
IN HIS FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECREE.

ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT ADVERSE POSSESSION COMEENCED ON SEPTEMBER 20th, 1940, AND
WAS ESTABLISHED SEPTEMBER 30th, 1947.
The appellants took the position in the court below, that
their adverse possession commenced on September 30th,
1940. Uintah County had received title by Auditor's Tax
Deed on April 15th, 1938 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, page 39).
On September 30th, 1940, the County Commissioners sold

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the property to Burns Hollett (the court finding in Finding
5, Rec. 98-99 that this is the same person as Burns Hallett)
as shown by Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 34, 35 and 36. The
Indian Department had been grazing these lands for many
years before this time (Tr. 194-198), and continued so to
graze the lands involved in this action (Tr. 195) in the period commencing November 15th, 1950, and ending May 1st,
1941. About March 20th or 21st, 1941, the Indian Department came up to "see about trespassing my cattle" as testified by Burns Hallett (Tr. 37). Prior to that date, Hallett
had been using the Indian "School lands" near his other
lands in Section 13, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Uintah
Special Meridian (Tr. 34, 35,) for the grazing of about 30
head of cattle (Tr. 46). An arrangement was made that
the Indian Department would use the lands in controversy
here during their grazing period from November 15th, each
year to the following May 1st, and that Burns Hallett would
use the Indian "School lands" in the spring, summer and
fall (Tr. 41). The Memorandum Decision (Rec. 68-70)
held:
''Burns Hallett, however, did not graze any cattle
upon the grounds in question, nor did he ever go
back to ascertain the success or failure of his ditch
construction. Rather, in the winter of 1940 and
the spring of 1941, he turned his stock upon the
range at his lower place, and allowed them to run
upon Indian lands. The Indians habitually grazed
their lands in the fall, through the winter and into
late spring, and the ground in question was suitable for grazing at that season. About March 20th
or 21st of 1941, Burns Hallett met with Joe A.
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Wagner and Ralph J. Richards, agents for the
Indian Service and the agents made some complaint to Hallett about the latter's cattle being
allowed to range upon Indian lands. Burns Hallett
told the agents of his claimed ownership of the
lands in question and suggested that the Indian
Department and he exchange grazing, he to be
allowed to turn his stock loose upon Indian lands
in the late spring and summer and early fall
months and the Department to graze the lands
belonging to Hallett, including the questioned lands,
during the late fall, winter and early spring."
(Emphasis ours.)

*****

"During all this period, 'Indian cattle ranged on
the lands in question 'every fall, winter, and early
spring,' and this grazing exhausted the utility of
the land."
Appellants agree with the trial court on the facts set
forth above, but object to the carrying forward of these facts
into finding 9 of the Findings of Fact (Rec. 4) in the following quoted particulars:
"during the summer of 1951" (line2 of finding 9).
"And that thereafter" (lines 9 and 10, finding 9).
Examining the Lower Court's Memorandum Decision as
above quoted, the excerpts from the Findings of Fact above
noted should read:
"On March 20th or 21st, 1951."
"and that beginning with the winter of 1940."
As to that part of finding 6 (Rec. 99) which read as
follows:
''That aside from locating the boundary lines on

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the said real estate, the said Burns Hallett did no
act whatsoever to take possession under his contract of purchase or to indicate to any person who
may have been interested in such land that he was
by such act taking or asserting actual possession
thereof under or by virtue of his contract above
referred to in paragraph 5."

.. .,:

Such finding is entirely in error, is contrary to the
evidence as set forth in the Memorandum Decision above
quoted, and also at variance with findings 7 and 9.
As to all other findings of the court from 1 to 9, the

appellants are in harmony.
What appellants do contend under this heading aside
from the few errors made by the lower court in his findings
6 and 9, is that the trial court failed to include in his findings
the possession of Morley Dean set forth at page 71 of the
record, and to carry into such findings his finding in his
Memorandum Decision as shown at page 76 of the record:
"It is therefore held that the possession of Hallett,
Bowen and Dean, in succession for the full seven
years was open and notorious within the requirements of the law. Thus, unless the plaintiffs have
failed to pay all taxes levied and assessed during
the adverse period, * * * the Court will have to
hold plaintiffs' possession adequate to entitle plaintiffs to judgment."

In the case of Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166
P.2d 239, the facts show that the county first leased the
property in question to a tenant, then sold under a contract
as in the present case, and then later conveyed by deed.
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This Supreme Court ruled that the defendant, Slechta, could
tack on the possession of the tenant and the contract holder.
The position of Burns Hallett under his contract of sale
would be the same as that of a tenant, and the giving of that
contract would be an act of the county in asserting possession in itself.
''The fact that there were defects in the proceedings
did not change the nature of the county's claim.
It was open, hostile and adverse to the record owner's right."
At pages 66 and 67 of the record, the Lower Court in
his Memorandum Decision, reasons on pages 4 and 5 of such
decision that the adverse possession of the plaintiffs and
their predecessors in interest did not begin until June 30th,
1941, when Burns Hallett cleaned out a ditch and brought
irrigation water onto the subject lands. The said decision
went to the effect that the prior grazing agreement between
Hallett and the Indian Agency and their respective uses
during the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941, were not
adverse acts. These findings were carried forward into
findings 7 and 9 of the findings of fact (Rec. 98-99) and
into conclusion 3 of the Conclusions of Law (Rec. 102).
This is on the basis that the adverser must himself do some
adverse act in order to start adverse possession by using the
property personally.
In the case of Kellogg v. Huffman, 30 P.2d 593, the adverser did not go upon the ground except to make a lease.
In that case, the lessees had been in actual possession and
20
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had used the property for many years prior to the purchase
by the adverser, just as the Indian Department had been
using the lands in the present case for many years prior to
the purchase by Burns Hallett. In that case, there was no
change in the use of the land thereafter and no notification
given to anyone except the lessees that the adverser was
taking posession and leasing the property to the tenants,
and the opinion reads:
"The appellants virtually concede that the use
thus made of this land during these years would
have been sufficient to establish a title by adverse
possession had this use been by the respondents
personally or by any tenant other than the Bourdieu brothers. But they argue that the Bourdieu
brothers, prior to their recognizing and renting
from the respondents, had for some years pastured
this land in connection with other lands used by
them without the permission of any one and under
no claim of right; that after the issuance of the
tax deed they continued to use the land in the
same manner as before; and that their use of the
land as tenants of the respondents could not inure
to the benefit of the respondents until notice of
a change in the manner of occupation and use was
brought home to the appellants. They rely on a
line of cases in which it has been held that a possession and use which has been entered into with
the consent of the owner cannot become adverse
to such owner without some notice of a canged
intention. While the rule just referred to has its
proper application in some cases, it neither applies
nor controls under the circumstances here appearing. It may first be observed that such use of
this land as was made by these tenants prior to
the time they leased the same from the respond-
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ents, was neither with the knowledge or consent
of the appellants. During those years they simply
allowed their sheep to roam over the land without
claim of right. A somewhat similar contention
was considered in the case of Holtzman v. Douglas,
168 U. S. 278, 18 S. Ct. 65, 66, 42 L. Ed. 466. In
that case the court said: 'The doctrine which the
plaintiff seeks to set up, we think is not applicable
to the facts of this case. After the puchase at the
tax sale, the delivery of the deed, and the recording thereof, Mrs. Douglas, in 1867, claimed title
to the land, and demanded possession thereof from
Rothwell, and by reason of the understanding then
arrived at between herself and Rothwell he became
the tenant of Mrs. Douglas as the representative
of the heirs at law of William Douglas, and such
tenancy continued up to the commencement of
this action. She went to him under a claim of
ownership and of the right to immediate possession
of the lot as owner. He then acknowledged her
right, became her tenant, and paid rent to her.
That certainly placed Mrs. Douglas, as the representative of the heirs, in possession of the lot.
From that time the facts are sufficient upon which
to base a claim of adverse possession. We think
it was inaugurated when Rothwell, under his agreement with Mrs. Douglas, acknowledged her right,
and paid her rent; and it was immaterial so far
as the heirs are concerned, that Rothwell had before that time entered upon the lot, although under no claim of title, and presumably in subordination of the title of plaintiff's predecessors. Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 328 (17 L. Ed.
871). If Rothwell were himself asserting a title
by adverse possession, while coming into possession by acknowledgement of and under the title of
the owners, there might be an opportunity for
the application of the doctrine contended for by
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plaintiff, and in such case Rothwell could not set
up title by adverse possession while entering in
subordination to the title of the owner, unless he
first vacated, and then retook possession as a hostile entry, or did some act necessarily evincing an
intention to put an end to his tenancy. We are
not dealing with Rothwell's rights or title. The
defendants did all they were called upon to do in
order to take possession and inaugurate an adverse holding, when they came with their tax
deed, claimed to own the property described in it,
and exercised an act of ownership by letting the
lot to Rothwell as a tenant at a certain rent. When
Rothwell recognized the claim of ownership, and
remained in possession from that time in subordination to the rights of Mrs. Douglas and the
heirs at law, their adverse possession, so far as
this point is concerned, was sufficiently inaugurated. Mrs. Douglas was no party or privy to the
prior entry of Rothwell, and therefore, whatever
the circumstances as proven in this case regarding such prior entry, her rights and those of the
heirs cannot be in any way affected thereby. There
is no pretense of any fraud or concealment in the
case by any one; certainly not by Mrs. Douglas.
Neither she nor the heirs were bound, in order
to maintain their rights, to give any written or
verbal notice to the former owners that they were
in possession through Rothwell; nor did the possession of Rothwell, as tenant of the Douglas heirs,
fail to commence at the time of this agreement
because he did not give notice to the former owners of his recognition of the title and right to the
possession as claimed by Mrs. Douglass.' ''
Appellants contend that under the rulings of the Bozievich v. Slecta case, supra, and the case of Kellogg v. Huff-
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man, supra, that the adverse possession actually commenced on September 30th, 1940, and under the facts found on
page 76 of the Memorandum Decision, continued until the
trial. Burns Hallett received full rental for the use by the
Indians of his lands during the fall, winter and spring of
1940 and 1941, by being allowed to graze the Indian lands
during the spring, summer and fall of 1941, and the understanding of March 20th, 1941, was a confirmation of the
use that each had of the other's property prior to that date.

As to the payment of taxes during such period or the
non-assessment of such taxes, the Lower Court found in
finding 11 (Rec. 101) that no taxes were assessed in 1941,
and that in 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946, the taxes were
promptly paid by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest. On page 14 of his Memorandum Decision (Rec.
76), the Lower Court found that no taxes were assessed for
the year 1940. The record shows that no taxes were assessed for the years 1940 and 1941, and that they were promptly
paid by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title for the
years 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946, or a total of seven
years successively.
Plaintiffs and appellants therefore take the stand that
adverse possession began on September 30th, 1940, that it
had ripened before the 1947 taxes became delinquent on
November 30th, 1947, and that the payment of said taxes
were not necessary to obtain the decree quieting their title.
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II.
REDEMPTION OF THE 1947 AND 1948 TAXES ON
DECEMBER 30th, 1949 HAD THE SAME EFFECT AS IF
THE TAXES WERE PAID BEFORE DELINQUENCY.
The appellants were not deprived of their title by any
tax sale prior to the filing of their complaint. The "PRELIMINARY TAX SALE" which is used as a basis for defeating plaintiffs' adverse title is shown at page 60 of Plaintiffs' Exhibit J. There is no date shown on the sale. There
is no proof in the record as to when it was made. It could
in all probability have been made after the filing of the
complaint on September 22, 1948.

If the respondent is

going to contend that redemption of taxes after the filing
of the plaintiffs' complaint is not a payment of taxes because plaintiffs were divested by a tax sale, he must prove
that there was a tax sale before the filing of such complaint.
This he has not done. The respondent is under as much
obligation in maintaining his title to pay taxes as the appellants are in maintaining their title, and the county is the one
who is protected by the statute requiring the payment of
taxes as a condition precedent to the granting of a decree
quieting title under adverse possession.
In the case of Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah 509, 261 Pac.
450, at the bottom of page 451 of the Pacific Reporter, it is
said:
"The owner of the property, within the period
allowed for redemption! had redeemed the property from that tax sale, and thereafter any right
that the county had by reason of the levy and
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the tax in the year 1917 was extinguished· to the
same extent that its claim would have been had
the taxes been paid prior to the delinquent tax sale
of December 17, 1917. Such is the plain intent of
the statute." Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, No. 6024."
Said Section 6024 became Section 80-10-59, R. S. U.
1933, Section 80-10-59, U. C. A. 1943, and is now Section
59-10-56, U. C. A. 1953. The statute has been slightly
amended to fit the new amendments to the tax laws but is
substantially the same as the 1917 statute.
Appellants paid the county and absolved the property
from the tax lien. Respondent did not pay these taxes.
Each having had an equal opportunity to pay the taxes, the
respondent cannot now complain about the rulings above
quoted, that the payment relates back and has the same
effect as if the taxes were paid before delinquency.
We think that this is further sanctioned by the rule
laid down in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 255 P.2d 989, and
goes further, as follows:
"Such title acquired after action begun, but before
defendant pleads adversely, may be . pleaded and
proved in derogation of the defendant's adverse
claim." (Citing Weiner v. Stearns, 1911, 40 Utah
185, 120 P. 490, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1175.)
The Answer of Culbert L. Olson (Rec. 7) is in no wise
an adverse claim to the property involved in this action.
His prayer that "his right, title and interest in any of the
real property described in plaintiff's complaint be ascertained and determined" is an admission that he himself has
not ascertained that he has any rights in the property and
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

certainly where several tracts are involved, his claim to be
adverse to any one of them must at least be sufficient to
show in particularity which piece of property he claims an
interest in. It it can be conceded, which appellants do not
admit, that the redemption of the 1947 taxes is "acquiring
title", under the present facts and circumstances and under
the above decision, the appellants have perfected that title by
paying the taxes on December 30th, 1949. The said "Answer" does not state any facts which could constitute an adverse claim against the property involved in this appeal.
Ill.

THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED
THE MOTIONS TO REOPEN AND THE MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL.
After the entry of the Memorandum Decision (Rec.
63-86) showing that the plaintiffs' possession did not commence to run until June 30th, 1941 (Rec. 67) and that it was
necessary to pay the 1947 taxes before the commencement
of the action to establish adverse possession under Section
78-12-12, U. C. A. 1953, the appellants filed their "MOTION
TO REOPEN" shown at pages 91 to 94 of the record. This
motion was made under Rule 61 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that it was necessary to reopen in
order that substantial justice to the parties might be done.
At pages 84 and 85 of the record, the Lower Court in
his Memorandum Decision states:
"Thus it must be held that when plaintiffs failed
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to pay the seventh year's taxes, they being lawfully assessed, their right of possession as adversers of the title terminated, and the constructive
possession of the owner attached, making plaintiffs mere trespassers. Keller vs. Chournos, supra."
{102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318).

*****
"The situation of the facts and law of the instant
case might well induce the same expression as the
court uses on page 545 of the Utah Report: 'There
are no equities on appellants' {defendant's) side
of this case. It tends to offend one's sense of justice, x x we are x x forced to adhere to the cases
so far decided on the strict rule.' "
If the Lower Court is relying on the cited case for auth-

ority to terminate the adverse possession by failure to pay
taxes, when did defendant Olson pay any taxes? When did
he start suit to quiet his title?.
In reading the Keller vs. Chournos case, supra, we find
at page 323 of the Pacific Reporter, the following:
"The most that defendants Chournos could claim,
under the record in this case, would be possession
of the land adverse to the legal owner and payment of the taxes thereon for a period of about
four years, from November 3, 1936, when they
took possession under the County's deed, until
plaintiff paid the general taxes for 1940 and instituted this action October 25, 1940."
The Trial Court held that Morley Dean paid the taxes
by redeeming them on December 30, 1949, but that such a
payment was not made before the commencement of the
action, and that redemption was not a payment of taxes
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under Section 78-12-12, U. C. A. 1953.
From the Motion and Affidavit supporting it (Rec.
91 to 94) it is stated that there was no evidence or presumption that the taxes for the year 1947 were "assessed according to law" as required by Section 78-12-12 supra.

The

supporting affidavit showed that the auditor's affidavits as
required by Sections 80-7-9 and 80-8-7 U. C. A. 1943, were
premature, and were dated May 5th, 1947 before the equilization meetings or extension of taxes.
To this Motion the court entered his "ORDER UPON
MOTION TO RE-OPEN" shown at pages 95 and 96 of the
recorq.

He made his denial to re-open upon the fact that

the appellants had not made the motion under Rule 60 (b)
R. C. P. 10 U. C. A. 662. This rule is for relief from a
judgment and no judgment having been entered, such supposition was premature artd not applicable. The Order
further states:
"The Court * * * * * holds that the adverser has
the burden of proving that he paid all seven years
taxes, or that there were no taxes assessed in any
year in which he failed to pay taxes, or that any
years taxes assessed which he did not pay were
not 'lawfully assessed.' " (Emphasis ours.)
THE PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS HAD
PAID THE TAXES BY THEIR REDEMPTION OF DECEMBER 30th, 1949 BEFORE THE FILING OF THE
CROSS-COMPLAINT ON JANUARY 9th, 1950. As heretofore shown in Sorensen v. Bills, supra, this had the same
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effect as if the taxes were paid before delinquent. The
plaintiffs and cross-defendants were not trying to find an
excuse for not paying taxes in making this motion insofar
as it pertained to this cross-complaint and counter-claim of
defendant and cross-complainant. The argument was that
inasmuch as the defendant and cross-complainant Olson had
made the claim that the redemption on December 30th,
1949 was not the payment of taxes for 1947 because there
was a valid tax sale, then it was the burden of the party
claiming that the sale was a valid sale to allege and prove
the validity of the 1947 sale. In other words, according to
the argument of defendant and cross-complainant, there
was a valid tax sale which divested plaintiffs and cross-defendants of their adverse title, and that the redemption of
the taxes on December 30th, 1949, was not the payment of
taxes but a redemption from the sale.
It is elementary in this state that one who relies upon

the validity of a tax sale proceeding must allege and prove
that "every essential step in the tax proceedings to divest
the owner of title has been conducted according to law."
Deseret Livestock Co. v. State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 401.
While the question has never been raised in this state as
far as appellants can find, it should be just as elementary
that one who relies upon the validity of a tax sale to divest
adverser of his adverse title and so to claim that a redemption of the tax sale is not the payment of taxes, the burden
of proving the validity of the tax sale upon which he relies
should fall squarely on the shoulders of the party asserting
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the validity of the tax sale. We again emphasize that had
appellants failed to pay the taxes at all, and were trying to
find an excuse for the non-payment, then the rule would
have been as outlined in the "ORDER UPON MOTION TO
RE-OPEN" (Rec. 91-94), and the burden of so proving
would have been upon appellants. But this is not the case.
After the entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree (Rec. 97-107), the plaintiffs filed a "Motion
to Reopen" under Rule 60 (b) (1) and (7), and a "Motion
for New Trial" under Rule 52 (b) and Rule 59 (a) (4), ( 6)
and (7), (Rec. 108-117.) These motions went to the effect
that the plaintiffs considered that their adverse possession
had matured before the 1947 taxes were delinquent, and
even though it was established after the 1947 taxes were
delinquent, that it had matured before the commencement
of the action, and that the redemption on December 29th,
1949, was a payment of the taxes for that year. Further
that the court found in his findings, conclusions and decree
that the 1947 taxes were "assessed according to law" when
there was no evidence before the court to substantiate such
a finding. Plaintiffs offered to present proof, if the case
were re-opened or a new trial granted, that the taxes for
1947 were not "assessed according to law" as provided by
Section 78-12-12 U. C. A. 1953. Affidavits showing that the
Auditor's Affidavits required by law as above set forth were
dated May 5th, 1947, and were premature, and therefore
the taxes were not assessed according to law, were affixed
to each of the Motions.
31
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The Trial Court overruled the motions (Rec. 120).
Appellants quote from the case of Telonis v. Staley,
104 U. 537, 144 P.2d 513, at page 517:
"When the auditor finally delivers the assessment
roll to the treasurer, it is required to be correct
and complete, and Sec. 80-8-7, R. S. U. 1933 (Sec.
6006, C. L. U. 1917), requires the assessment roll
as corrected to be verified by the auditor. The
auditor must declare under oath that he has corrected it and has made it conform to the requirements of the county board of equalization and the
State Tax Commission, and that the respective
sums due as taxes have been computed and that
he has added up the column of valuations, taxes,
and acreage as required by law. See Sec. 2606,
R. S. U. 1898, and C. L. U. 1907. When the assessment roll is thus delivered to the treasurer with
the final auditor's affidavit of authentication, the
auditor certifies the same as the tax roll to the
treasurer and to the public that the assessment
roll as the official tax roll is complete and correct.
The aforesaid affidavit is one of the statutory
functions of the county auditor, and such affidavit
must be executed and properly attached. The property owner is entitled to rely on such verification
and the treasurer is bound thereby and he is required to proceed to issue the tax notices in accordance therewith, and to collect the taxes based on
the computations of the auditor. The final affidavit of the auditor thus becomes highly important, and in the absence of any curative provision
in the statutes for failure of the auditor to subscribe to and attach such certificate of authentication in affidavit form, the requirement of the statute must be observed."
32
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The above quoted case is upheld in Equitable Life &
Casualty Ins. Co., v. Schoewe, 105 Utah 569, 144 P.2d 526;
Tree v. White, 110 Utah 1033, 171 P.2d 398; Petterson v.
Ogden City, Utah, 111 Utah 125, 176 P.2d 599; Jenkins v.
Moran, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871, and Pender v. Jackson,
et al., 260 P.2d 542.

In the last case, this Supreme Court

held:
"Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P.2d 513,
517, held that the statutes requiring attachment
of the auditor's affidavits to the assessment rolls,
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 59-7-9 and 59-8-7, established a substantive rule, designed for the protection
of the taxpayer, and 'in the absence of any curative provision in the statutes for failure of the
auditor to subscribe to -and attach such certificate
of authentication in affidavit form, the requirement of the statute must be observed.'" (Emphasis
ours.)
Morley Dean and Irene Dean, plaintiffs and cross-defendants, are just as much taxpayers as is Culbert L. Olson,
defendant and cross-complainant, when taxes are assessed
to them or their predecessors, and the rule in the last quoted
case should apply just as much to the adverser as to the
original owner.

What is sauce for the goose should be

sauce for the gander.
In the said Telonis case, supra, this Supreme Court
granted a new trial although there is nothing in the decisions in either Telonis case to show that a new trial was
asked for.
In view of the fact that the court made the statement
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in his Memorandum Decision (Rec. 84-85) that his decision
"tends to offend one's sense of justice," his rulings denying
the motions to reopen and for a new trial appear to the
appellants to be arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. Appellants should have been allowed to present proof that the
1947 taxes were not "levied and assessed upon such land
according to law" as required by Section 104-2-12, U. C. A.
1943, as carried forward into Section 78-12-12, U. C. A.
1953. In such event, the plaintiffs would have shown the
invalidity of the 1947 sale, and should have recovered on
their complaint under the lower court's ruling that they
had more than seven years adverse possession (Rec. 76).
IV.

APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED A
DECREE QUIETING THEIR TITLE AS CROSS-DEFENDANTS ON THEIR ANSWER TO THE CROSS-COMPLAINT
OF RESPONDENT, AND AS PLAINTIFFS ON THEIR
ANSWER TO THE COUNTER-CLAIM IN THE AMENDED ANSWER OF THE DEFENDANT.
Granting for argument, but not conceding, that the
lower court was right in holding that plaintiffs did not pay
the taxes for 1947 before they were delinquent, and that
this seventh year of taxes were required to be paid before
the commencement of the action, and therefore could not
recover under the complaint, yet the cross-defendants in
the various cross-complaints, and the plaintiffs under their
answer to the counter-claim of defendant Olson in his Amen34
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ded Answer, should have been given a decree quieting their
title for the following reasons:

A.
APPELLANTS PAID ALL TAXES ASSESSED PRIOR
TO THE FILING OF THE CROSS-COMPLAINT AND
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COUNTER-CLAIM IN
THE AMENDED ANSWER.
Appellant Morley Dean redeemed the 1947 and 1948
taxes, and paid the 1949 taxes on December 30th, 1949
(Rec. 81; Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 59 and 61; Tr. 100).
There is no dispute about this.
Culbert L. Olson, Cross-Complainant, filed his Cross
Complaint on January 9th, 1950 (Rec. 17-20). He continued to file various cross-complaints until his "CROSS-COMPLAINT of Defendant CULBERT L. OLSON", Amending
and Replacing His Third Amended Cross-Complaint (Rec.
43-50).

In his "AMENDED ANSWER OF CULBERT L.

OLSON" (Rec. 12-14), the defendant Olson makes his first
counter-claim, and in fact his first answer, alleging in paragraph III on page 2:
"Further answering, this defendant affirmatively
avers that he is the sole owner of said land and
every part thereof in fee simple; that he is in possession of said land, and that the plaintiffs, or either
or any of them have no right, title, estate or interest in, to or upon said land or any part thereof."
This Amended Answer was filed April 1st, 1950. It was
the first Answer that alleged any interest in the particular
35
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

land involved in this appeal. In it, the defendant plead for
a decree quieting his title.
The plaintiffs and cross-defendants answered the various cross-complaints and the counter-claim in the Amended
Answer by setting up a claim of adverse possession and the
payment of taxes. The claim of adverse possession and the
payment of taxes was not made by plaintiffs and crossdefendants until after they had paid all taxes which had
been levied and assessed prior to the interposition of the
various cross-complaints and amended answer containing
the counter-claim.

B.
THE REDEMPTION OF THE 1947 AND 1948 TAXES
ON DECEMBER 30, 1949, WAS THE PAYMENT OF TAXES UNDER SECTION 78-12-12 U. C. A. 1953.
The Lower Court held in Conclusion of Law No. 2
(Rec. 102) that plaintiffs could not recover on their complaint for the reason that adverse possession did not begin
to run until June 30, 1941, and the plaintiffs had not paid
the taxes for the year 1947, which was the seventh year,
until after the filing of the complaint. Granting for the
sake of argument, that he was right in so doing, the claim
that redemption is not the payment of taxes does not go
to the original complaint, but applies only to the effect of
such redemption made prior to the filing of the cross-complaints and counter-claim.
The record is very clear that the plaintiffs and cross36
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defendants paid all of the taxes that were paid between
June 30th, 1941, the time the court found adverse possession commenced, and January 9th, 1950, when the defendant Olson filed his first cross-complaint. OLSON PAID NO
TAXES DURING THIS PERIOD.
The Lower Court in his Memorandum Decision (Rec.
83) to support his holding under Section 104-2-12 U. C. A.
1953), that the plaintiffs had not "shown that the land has
been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years
continuously and that the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have been levied and assessed
upon such land according to law," relied upon the cases of
Keller vs. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318, Jenkins
vs. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871, Home Owners Loan
Corporation vs. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160, and
Smith vs. Nelson, 113 Utah 51, 197 P.2d, 132. In all of
those cases, the pretended adverser did not pay all of the
taxes during the period of adversity, or the record owner
had either paid all of the taxes or paid taxes before the
period of adverse possession had run.
Our statute governing this situation, Section 78-12-12
U. C. A. 1953 (formerly 104-2-12, U. C. A. 1943), does not
require the continuous payment of taxes, but requires that
the adverser and his predecessors "have paid all taxes which
have been levied and assessed upon such land according to
law."
It has already been determined in this state, that re-
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demption is the payment of taxes. By way of repitition to
confirm this point, we again quote Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah
509, 261 Pac. 450, at the bottom of page 451, as follows:
"The owner of the property, within the period
allowed for redemption, had redeemed the property from the tax sale, and thereafter any right
that the county had by reason of the levy and
the tax in the year 1917 was extinguished to the
same extent that its claim would have been had
the taxes been paid prior to the delinquent tax sale
on December 17, 1917. Such is the plain intent of
the statute." Comp. Laws Utah 1917, No. 6024.
Section No. 6024 is virtually the same as Section 59-1056, U. C. A. 1953.
Section 59-10-1 U. C. A. 1953 (formerly 80-10-1, U. C.
A. 1943) provides:
"Every tax has the effect of a judgment against
the person, and every lien created by this title has
the force and effect of an execution duly levied
against all personal property of the delinquent.
The judgment is not satisfied nor the lien removed
until the taxes are paid or the property sold for
the payment thereof."
Section 59-10-3 (formerly Section 80-10-3, U. C. A.
1943) provides:
"Every tax upon real property is a lien against
the property assessed; and every tax due upon
improvements upon real estate assessed to others
than the owner of the real estate is a lien upon
the land and improvements; which several liens
attach as of the 1st day of January of each year."
In construing Section 80-10-32, R. S. U. 1933 (which
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by amendment became Section 80-10-32, U. C. A. 1943, and
is now Section 59-10-33, U. C. A. 1953) in connection with
the above quoted sections, this Supreme Court in Western
Beverage Co., of Provo, Utah v. Hansen, 98 Utah 332, 96
P.2d 1105, said:
" 'Sale' and 'sold', as herein used, do not refer to
such sale as extinguishes the title of the owner and
initiate a new title in the purchaser, either county
or otherwise, so as to extinguish the right to redeem, nor prevent revesting of title in the owner
upon redemption or the assignee lienholder, upon
expiration of the redemption period when assignment of certificate of tax sale has been made to
the recorded lien holder."
Most assuredly, under the 1939 amendment, Section
80-10-32, U. C. A. 1943 and the present statute Section
59-10-33, U. C. A., "sale" and "sell" could not be held to
divest the delinquent tax payer of his title, as the sale is
a ''PRELIMINARY SALE.''
If then, the redemption puts the owner back in the

same position as if he had paid the taxes before sale, then
the redemption is the payment of the taxes, and no injury
to the owner's rights results from the delinquency.
Attention is also invited to Section 59-10-64 ( 4), U. C.
A. 1953 (formerly Section 80-10-68 (4) U. C. A. 1943),
which provides that the county must sell the property on
bid at the Auditor's Sale to the person bidding the taxes,
penalties, interests and costs who offers said sum for the
least amount of property, and states in part:
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"In the event the bid accepted is for less than the
entire parcel, the auditor shall note the fact, with
a description of the property covered by the bid,
upon the tax sale record and the balance of the
parcel not affected by said bid shall be deemed to
have been redeemed by the owner thereof." (Emphasis ours.)
The statute still considers that the delinquent is the
"owner" of the title. No re-conveyance or redemption of
this property in the usual form is required. Surely there
can be only one conclusion that prior to the Auditor's
Certificate required by Section 59-10-64 (6) U. C. A. 1953,
the county has no vested title in the property by reason
of the preliminary sale, and that its lien is extinguished
by the payment of the taxes either before delinquency, by
redemption, or by a bid therefor for less than the entire
tract.
Under Section 59-10-56 U. C. A. 1953 and all prior
statutes thereto, redemption may be made by the payment
of taxes, penalty, interest and costs. The addition of the
words "penalty, interest and costs" does not diminish the
force of the "payment of taxes."
The provisions of the statutes are for the benefit of
the county and not for the benefit of the defendant and
cross-complainant. As long as the county and the taxing
districts are satisfied by the payment made by the taxpayer,
the non-taxpayer Olson cannot show any prejudice.
In Aggelos v. Zelia Mining Co., 99 Utah 417, 107 P.2d
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170, reference is made to two California cases, namely Owsley v. Matson, 156 Cal. 401, 104 P. 983; and Warden v.
Bailey, 133 Cal. App. 383, 24 P.2d 192. In the case of Owsley
v. Matson, supra, the court said:
"But where, as in the present case, the tax has
been allowed to become delinquent and a sale has
taken place, and, so far as appears, while the
party or his successor in interest was in undisturbed possession, and all this is done in good faith,
we see no reason why the same should not be held
to operate as a payment, and we think it is sufficient to bring the occupant within the terms of the
statute which requires him to pay the taxes upon
the property claimed.''
The lower court held that there was no question about
the possession of Morley Dean after his purchase on May
18th, 1947 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, page 56), as stated in
the Memorandum Decision at page 71 of the Record:
"There is no question of the use and occupancy of
the property since the Dean purchase and possession."
The redemption was made while Dean was in "undisputed possession."
As to the "good faith" of Dean in allowing the taxes to
go delinquent and redeeming them, the record clearly shows
this "good faith." A decree quieting title to the property
involved against the defendant and cross-claimant Olson,
was recorded December 2nd, 1946 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J,
pages 51-52). He had received a Warranty Deed for the
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

property (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, page 56). He thought he
had a marketable title, and any attorney in the area from
an examination of his abstract would have given him an
opinion to that effect. As a layman, he relied implicitly
upon his Warranty Deed and did not think that he stood
in the position of an adverser.
He has continued in
possession right up to the present time. During the possession, and before trial, he has caused the land to be irrigated, has fenced it, and has converted it from a barren sagebrush covered place to a summer pasture in which he pastures 60 head of cattle during the summer (Tr. 96).
In his Memorandum Decision at page 22 thereof (Rec.
84) the Lower Court says:
"So long as the adverser maintains such possession
and pays such taxes, the constructive possession
of the owner stands suspended. But because he is
the title holder, and because his possession is preswned in the law, whenever the adverser either
fails to maintain his possession in all of its elements, or whenever he fails to pay any taxes lawfully levied and assessed against the land, by such
failure he changes his status from an adverser to
that of a mere trespasser, the constructive possession of the legal title holder attaches, and the adverser, if he is to acquire title, must build from
that point forward his seven years of adversity and
payment of taxes."
Paragraph 2 (Rec. 102) of the Conclusions of law
reads:
"That the said plaintiffs' intestate and his predecessors in interest occupied such real property,
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openly, exclusively, adversely, notoriously, continuously and under claim of right from June 30,
1941 until the 30th day of November, 1946, but
lost their status as adversers and became mere
trespassers following such date, because of failure
to pay the taxes for the year 1947 as required by
law."

r.:

(

From the foregoing it is not difficult to see that the
Lower Court intended that the last part of the foregoing
sentence should have read "because of failure to pay the
taxes for the year 1947 as required by law before they were
delinquent.''
The Lower Court when this case was argued on the
last motions made it clear that his stand was that if an
adverse possessor paid his taxes regularly for six years and
then let them go delinquent one year, that by such delinquency he would lose all of his adverse rights even though
he redeemed the property from sale at a later date, and
that he would have to start all over again. If he then held
adversely for another six years, and let his seventh year's
taxes go delinquent, his adverse possession would again
cease and terminate, and again he would have to start over.
This could go on for a hundred years and the adverser could
never get adverse possession until he had paid seven years
taxes each year successively before they were delinquent.
Section 78-12-9 U. C. A. 1953 (formerly Section 104-2-9
U. C. A. 1943) defines what constitutes adverse possession.

There is no mention of the payment of taxes being a part
of adverse possession.
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Section 78-12-12 U. C. A. (formerly Section 104-2-12 U.
C. A. 1943) recites:
"In no case shall adverse possession be considered
established under the provisions of any section of
this Code, unless it shall be shown that the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of
seven years continuously, and that the party, his
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes
which have been levied and assessed upon such
land according to law." (Emphasis ours.)
This section provides two subdivisions for the establishment of adverse possession, one being that the property be
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and the other is that the payment of taxes is a
condition precedent to the granting of the decree. No
statement is made as to when the taxes must be paid. No
statement is made as to the length of time the taxes must
have been paid. It has been held by this Supreme Court
consistently that the intent of the statute is that seven
years' taxes must be paid.
It would seem to the writer that the provision for the
payment of taxes has one of two purposes: First, to protect
the owner from losing his property by adverse possession as
long as he pays taxes; and second, to insure the payment of
the taxes to the taxing units as a condition precedent to the
granting of the decree quieting title. The defendant Olson
did not protect himself by paying any taxes on the property
for the years 1933 to 1949 inclusive. He made no attempt
to do so. The taxing units have been fully paid by the plain-
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tiffs and their predecessors in interest from 1940 to 1949
inclusive, for all taxes which have been levied whether they
were assessed according to law or not.
The Lower Court took this statute to mean that the
taxes must be paid "as required by law" before the delinquent date each year consecutively.
no such meaning into this statute.

Appellants can read
We have been unable

to find any cases supporting the Lower Court's holding that
delinquency in the payment of taxes results in the cessation
of adverse possession even though the taxes are later redeemed by the adverser except in states which have a statute requiring such payment as does New Mexico as set forth
in McGrail v. Fields, 203 P.2d, 1000.

The Lower Court

quoted this case in his Memorandum Decision as controlling.
The statutes are entirely different.

c.
AGAINST THE COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSSCOMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT OLSON, PLAINTIFFS
AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS CAN RELY UPON THE
REDEMPTION AND PAYMENT OF TAXES ON DECEMBER 30th, 1949.
On page 15 of his Memorandum Decision (Rec. 77),
it is held:
"On December 30, 1949, all delinquent taxes, interest, penalties and costs were paid by 'J. Parry
Bowen by Morley Dean,' (the latter having succeeded to the County's Rights on May 8, 1947,)
and a Redemption Certificate was issued. Pay45
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ment of such taxes is mandatory if an adverse
claimant is to obtain title."
As heretobefore shown in the next preceding subdivision of this brief, the redemption of the taxes on December
30th, 1949, for the years 1947 and 1948, and the payment
on said date of the 1949 taxes, constituted a payment of
taxes within the meaning of the statute as set forth in
Sorensen v. Bills, supra.

As previously set forth, this re-

demption related back and had the same effect as if the
taxes were paid before delinquent. However, even though
this were not the case, the taxes were paid before the filing
of the Cross-Complaint (Rec. 17-20) on January 9th, 1950,
and the filing of the counter-claim (Rec. 12-14) on April
21st, 1950.
In Rowley v. Davis, 34 Cal. App. 184, 167 Pac. 162,
the court said:
"Referring to the record thus presented, appellant
insists that the judgment should be reversed, because the action must be determined upon the
facts as they existed at the time of the commencement of the suit; 'Rowley not having pleaded any
after-acquired title.' It is true that the plaintiff
did not attempt to supplement his complaint by a
statement showing title acquired after the action
was commenced; also it is the law that he would
not have a right to file a supplemental complaint
showing after-acquired title, if in fact he had no
title at the commencement of the action. Imperial
Land Co. v. Imperial Irrigation District, 173 Cal.
668, 161 Pac. 116, L. R. A. 1916D, 676, note. But
the cross-complaint of the defendant Davis was
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not filed until after plaintiff Rowle), had acquired
the title of the defendant and cross-defendant Alice
Huse. By filing that cross-complaint the crosscomplainant tendered new issues, whereby he set
up a cause of action which relates to the date of
filing the cross-omplaint. This he had the right
to do. Johnson v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201, 208, 88
Pac. 903, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818, 119 Am. St. Rep.
181. The fact that Rowley had at that time acquired the title of Mrs. Huse was available to him
as a defense to the cross-action, and was provable
under his claim of ownership as pleaded by his
answer to the cross-complaint. If this were not
so, a defendant by filing a cross-complaint would
be able to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing an
action which had been prematurely brought, and
might thereby obtain 'on the merits' a judgment
which possibly would permanently cut out the just
rights of the plaintiff, by preventing him from
thereafter litigating the title with the cross-complainant. We therefore are of the opinion that
the judgment should be sustained, if the evidence is
sufficient to support Rowley's title as existing at
the time of filing the cross-complaint."
The above case is quoted with approval in Meagher v.
Uintah Gas Co., supra, although in a manner not applicable
here.
Section 78-12-5 U. C. A. 1953 (formerly Section 104-2-5
U. C. A. 1943) provides:
"No action for the recovery of real property or
for the possession thereof shall be maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor,
grantor or predecessor was seized or possessed of
the property in question within seven years before
the commencement of the action."
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Section 78~12-6 U. C. A. 1953 (formerly Section 104-2-6
C. A. 1943) provides:
"No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to
an action, founded upon the title to real property
or to rent or profits out of the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that the person prosecuting
the action, or interposing the defense or counterclaim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted
or defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor of such person was
seized or possessed of the property in question
within seven years before the committing of the
act in respect to which such action is prosecuted
or defense or counterclaim made."
(Emphasis
ours).

Applying this to the present action would make it read
like this:
"No counterclaim to an action, founded upon the
title to real property or to rents or profits out of
the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that
the person interposing the counterclaim, or under
whose title the counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor of such person was
seized or possessed of the property in question
within seven years before the committing of the
act in respect to which such counterclaim is made."
In other words, the statute runs up to the time of the
interposing of the counterclaim, the act in the counterclaim
being the claim of title and possession on the part of the
defendant.
The Amended Answer of Culbert L. Olson (Rec. 12-14),
sets out his counterclaim in paragraph III as follows:
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"Further answering, this defendant affirmatively
avers that he is the sole owner of said land and
every part thereof in fee simple; that he is in
possession and is entitled to the possession of said
land, and that the plaintiffs, or either or any of
them have no right, title, estate or interest in,
to or upon said land or any part thereof."
This counterclaim was not interposed until April 21st,
1950.
The plaintiffs in the original complaint did not allege
adverse possession or limitations. In their answer to the
cross-claim in the amended answer (Rec. 15-16) plaintiffs
set up adverse possession and the payment of taxes, in
addition to the two above quoted limitation statutes as a
defense to this counterclaim.
The defendant Olson made no reply to the affirmative
matter to the "Answer to Cross-Claim, in Amended Answer"
(Rec. 15-1.6).
The actual fact is that the case was tried upon the
issue raised by the counterclaim in the amended answer,
and the answer thereto setting up adverse possession and
the payment of taxes, as well as limitations and laches.
Judgment was to the effect that the plaintiffs could not
recover on their complaint and that the defendant have
judgment of no cause of action thereon. Judgment was
given to Olson on his counterclaim by the Conclusion of
Law 4 (Rec. 103).
We invite the attention of this Supreme Court to the
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discussion in the case of Weiner v. Stearnes, 40 Utah 185,
120 Pac. 490. At page 497 of the Pacific Reporter it is said:
Taking either horn of the delimma, therefore, we
cannot see how Borg can successfully contend that
the statute of limitations did not run against him.
Counsel have not been able to find any case directly in point, and after a most diligent search we
have been unable to do so. We are firmly convinced, however, that, both in reason and upon
principle, the appellant, under the undisputed facts,
should prevail in this case. Our statute relating
to adverse possession should be given a fair and
reasonable application by the courts. In applying the statute, courts should aim to protect the
substantial rights of all of the parties interested
in the subject of action, and where the statutory
time has fully elapsed, and the clain1ant in possession has complied with the provisions of the statute, the title to the property is vested in him, the
same as though he had the most formal title deed.
In this case the question is not one of dispute or
conflicting facts. In our judgment, the tr:al court
erred in his application of the law to the undisputed facts. Under such circumstances, we have
quite as good an opportunity to determine the result as had the trial court. In our judgment, the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree are
clearly against both the law and the evidence."
While judgment was denied the plaintiffs on their complaint, we think the ruling in Weiner v. Stearns, supra,
applies with full impact to the counterclaim. Section 78-126, U. C. A. segregates "defense or counterclaim", and in
litigation based upon the counterclaim upon which judgment is given, the statute is not tolled until the "interposi50
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tion" of the counterclaim. At the time of the "interposition"
of the counterclaim in this case, the taxes had been fully
paid by the plaintiffs up to and including the year 1949.
While plaintiffs may not have been entitled to judgment on
the complaint (which they do not admit), they are entitled
to judgment on the counterclaim of the defendant. Rowley
v. Davis, supra.
In fact, the Lower Court on granting judgment on the
counterclaim, awarded to plaintiffs judgment for the taxes
paid on December 30th, 1949 (Rec. 106). If the Lower
Court gives plaintiffs judgment for the payment of taxes,
how can he in the same breath say that plaintiffs lost the
action for failure to pay those very taxes?
As to the defendant being barred by limitations, his
testimony from pages 3 to 23 of the transcript clearly shows
that he took no interest in this property at all from 1932
to the late fall of 1949, when he was served with summons.
He made no contacts with the property during that period.
On September 19th, 1949, he wrote a letter in which he
stated (Tr. 16; Plaintiffs' Exhibit F):
"I do not know at this time what interest I still
have in the land in Uintah County."
Plaintiffs Exhibit H, dated December 22, 1949, a letter
from defendant Olson, states:
"Furthermore, I think I shall be able to prove
that my agents were in possession before that date
and all during the years of the tax delinquency
under lease agreement to pay those taxes; that
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they purposely permitted the taxes to become delinquent and were parties in interest in the sale
made by the County." (Emphasis ours.)
Plaintiffs' Exhibit I, dated March 21st, 1950, a letter
from defendant Olson, makes the statement that he had
leased this land and other parties were to pay the taxes on
it.
However, in his testimony (Tr. 3-22) he repudiates all
of these letters, except his first statement, and tries to set
up an agency with C. I. Johnson and another with Ercil
Johnson.

His first statement that he did not know what

interest he had in the property is the correct one.
For more than eight years after the Lower Court held
that the plaintiffs and their predecessors had commenced
adverse possession on June 30th, 1941, the defendant paid
no attention to his property.
In Hammond v. Johnson, 92 Utah, 211, 94 Utah 20,

66 P.2d 894, it is said:
"It is elemental that an interruption of adverse
user by the owner must be actual and not merely
declarations or verbal protests. * * * Such interruption of the adverse claimant's occupancy or
user, to stop the running of the statute, must be
of the same definite character as must the adverse
claimant's possession and user be to start the
statute running. The interruption must be open,
notorious, and under claim of right such as to
manifest an intention to repossess the property
and dispossess the occupant, and be a challenge to
his right and dominion. It must bear on its face
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an unequivocal intention to take possession. Smith
v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 1 Cal. (2d) 272, 34 P.2d
713, Bonebrake v. Flourney, 133 Okl. 101, 271
P. 658; 2 C. J. p. 96; Nelson v. Johnson, 189 Ky.
815, 226 s. w. 94.
Under the Lower Court's ruling that adverse possession commenced June 30th, 1941, and that adverser must pay
taxes, defendant Olson in order to interrupt the adverse
possession, must come in before June 30th, 1948 and take
possession and pay taxes or the adverse possession becomes
complete upon the paying of the taxes by the adverser.
While the case of Hammond v. Johnson, supra, is a
water case, the cases cited are real property actions and
the rule quoted applies with like effect to real property
actions.

v.
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT OLSON
IS BARRED BY LACHES FROM ASSERTING HIS ANSWER, CROSS-COMPLAINTS AND COUNTER-CLAIM.
The case of Petterson v. Ogden City, 111 Utah, 1925,
176 P.2d 599, states:
"Laches: 'is a negative equitable remedy, closely
related in its nature and objective with estoppel,
which deprives one of some right or remedy to
which he would otherwise be entitled, because his
delay in seeking it has operated to the prejudice
of another.' 2 Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence
1121. See 19 Am. Jur. 338-343."
"Both laches and estoppel are bars which in certain circumstances may be raised to defeat a right
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or claim a party otherwise would have. The courts
refuse to give their aid to the party who has
slept on his rights or who because of his actions
or inaction when action was required is not fairly entitled to relief."
When the Abstract of Title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J) was
forwarded to the defendant Olson in December 1949, it contained the Oil and Gas Leases shown at pages 39 and 40
and 53 and 54. It also contained the Tax Sale shown at
page 60. He was told on December 7th, 1949 in a telephone
conversation that there was an oil well drilling "about nine
miles" distant from this land (Tr. 260).
As set forth in the next preceding argument, defendant
Olson went completely to sleep insofar as this land was
concerned between 1933 and 1949, and took no personal
interest in this land. He did not see the land between 1915
and 1950 (Tr. 257).
Then all of a sudden after finding out there were oil
leases on the land and wells were drilling in the vicinity,
he takes an especial interest in the land. He has spent
considerable time here in Utah in connection with this law
suit.
Taking the value of the land for its normal uses
into consideration, he has already spent more money than
the land could be sold for when used for such purposes,
many times over.
Morley Dean has improved the land considerably as
heretofore shown. He has spent considerable money upon
it. When he bought the land there was a Decree Quieting
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;-

Title of record and he received a Warranty Deed as heretofore shown. Likewise, as heretofore shown, he can now
pasture 60 head of cattle during the summer upon this land.
In the case of Livermore v. Beal et.al. (four cases),
64 P. 2d 987 (Cal App.) the court said:
"It was also further held that the statute of limitations did not control equity in applying the
principle of laches.
"In view of the fact of the change in the value of
lands by reason of the discovery of oil or gas
therein, the language of Justice Brewer, quoted in
the case of Troll v. City of St. Louis, 257 Mo. 626,
168 S. W. 167, 175, and approved in the Grossman
Case, is applicable here to wit: 'No doctrine is so
wholesome, when wisely administrated, as that of
laches. It prevents the resurrection of stale titles,
and forbids the spying out from the records of
It requires of
ancient and abandoned rights.
every owner that he take care of his property, and
of every claiment that he make known his claims.
It gives to the actual and longer possesor security,
and induces and justifies him in all efforts to improve and make valuable the property he holds,'
etc. Or, in other words, one is not permitted to
stand by while another develops property in which
he claims an interest, and then, if the property
proves valuable, assert a claim thereto, and, if it
does not prove valuable, be willing that the losses
incurred in the exploration be borne by the opposite
party.
This thought was expressed in one case
by the following language: 'if the property proves
good, I want it; if it is valueless, you keep it."

_In this case, the Lower Court is barring the plaintiffs
from recovering on the ground that they did not pay the
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1947 taxes before they became delinquent on November
30th, 1947, and not on the ground that they were not paid
by the plaintiffs.
The lower court found that plenty of
time for adverse possession had elapsed.
The plaintiffs
did pay the taxes.
Defendent Olsen was served with
summons before the 1947, 1948 and 1949 taxes were paid,
and if he had been so anxious about the payment of the
taxes, he could have paid them himself before Dean paid
them on December 30th, 1949. Can he be excused from not
paying these taxes to interrupt the adverse possession of
Dean, when the law requires him to pay them if he is to
keep his title, and then take the property away from Dean
after payment has been made by Dean? We think the answer is obvious.

VI.
THE LOWER COURT MADE SOME MINOR ERRORS
IN HIS FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECREE.
In many cases in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree (Rec. 101-107), the Lower Court uses the
words "plaintiff's intestate," "plaintiff administratrix,"
"she," "her" and other designations to indicate Frances H.
Bowen as Administratrix of the Estate of J. Parry Bowen,
Deceased. J. Parry Bowen conveyed all of his interest in
the subject lands to Keith J .Bowen on April 26th, 1947
(Plaintiff's Exhibit J, page 55).
The deceased had no
interest in the property at the time of the filing of this
action on September 22nd, 1948.
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Further, in finding 9, on page 100 of the record, in
the second line the words "during the summer of 1941"
should read "about March 20th or 21st of 1941" as shown
in the Memorandum Decision, page 7, line 8. (Rec. 69).
CONCLUSION.

Plaintiffs contend that they should have judgment
for the following reasons:
1. That they had open, notorious, peaceable and continuous adverse possesion from September 30th, 1940, to
January 9th, 1950, and paid all taxes which were levied
and assessed according to law during that period.
2.

That defendent had no possession during the period

set forth above and paid no taxes during said period, and is
barred by limitations and laches from recovering.
3.

That the lower Court erred in carrying his findings

of fact insofar as the legal effect of such findings of fact
are concerned from his Morandum Decision into his Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree.
4.

That the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Decree are contrary to law.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE B. STANLEY
COLTON & HAMMOND
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Cross-Defendants and
Appellants.
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